America in Decline?

[Q&A] Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor to U.S. President Jimmy Carter, discusses the implications of the rise of China and what it means for the United States.

On the heels of the release of his most recent book, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke to The Mark about the implications of the rise of China and what it means for American power.

As you point out in [your] book, there have been other periods in recent American history where the U.S. was seen to be in decline. For example, with the launch of Sputnik in 1957 ... after the Vietnam War and Watergate, right before you took office. So is today actually any different? Is the decline of the U.S. in 2012 more real than it has been in the past?

I think it’s more real, because in the past there were periods of uncertainty, and perhaps some degree of pessimism, but there wasn’t really a convincing rival whose dynamism and appeal threatened to shadow America’s. Today, in a way, there is, although I do not necessarily view China as such a rival yet. Nonetheless, the fact is that it is developing rapidly, its infrastructure is changing dramatically, its appeal to many places in the world is very much on the rise at a time [when] America, on a number of fronts (as I discuss in more detail in my book), is either stalled, or stagnating – or on the political level, very divisive.

The rise of China doesn’t necessarily mean the decline of America. So how would you characterize the decline of the U.S.?


The decline is not in the sense that one is going downhill and the other is going uphill. It’s a little more like two different people of different ages are walking forward. Let’s say someone who is 22 years old and someone who is two years old. Obviously, the 22-year-old will be walking much faster than the two-year-old. But 25 years later, when the 22-year-old is close to 50 and the other one is in [his or her] twenties, the latter one is moving forward much more rapidly and can pass by the older one. In that sense, America is declining, [and] the rates of growth and prospective levels of accomplishment –particularly in the realm of economic power – that China seems to be attaining suggests that the position of America is at least challenged.

What do you see as the consequence of a diminished role of the U.S. in global affairs – or of an increasing Chinese role, for that matter?


That depends very much on the context and the rapidity in which it occurs. If the context is hostile and the rapidity of the change in their relative positions is very high, then I think the results can be very destabilizing – not result necessarily in Chinese global domination, but more likely in some form of global chaos.

But if the process is more gradual, there is far greater opportunity for intelligent mutual accommodation. And who knows how long these differentials in rates of growth will continue? China might also itself slow down at some point.

You say in your book that China isn’t necessarily looking to play the same role that American power has traditionally played. Is there any realistic chance that China would ever assume America’s traditional role in the world?


Well, that depends [laughs] on how you define that traditional role, because I think in some respects it’s changed for the worse in the last decade or so, especially with the misadventure in Iraq and the overambitious internal goals in Afghanistan. The Chinese have strongly embedded traditions of imperial domination, largely by indirection and acquiescence, and not by direct conquest. Moreover, today, even though they call themselves communist, they are not propagating the notion that someday their system will be emulated worldwide the way the Soviets once were. I think the Chinese are more indirect and more pragmatic.

Do you think the Americans still see China as an enemy in the same way? Obviously their relationship is different than it was with the previous communist regime in the USSR. But do you think in American circles they still see China as an enemy because it is a communist country?


I don’t think so. I think something else has happened. Namely, that after the normalization of relations in 1978 achieved by [former] president [Jimmy] Carter – and negotiated by me – there were high expectations for a very cordial relationship and a great deal of admiration for China’s internal change. Lately, sentiments in America have somewhat changed: There is more criticism of China – more uneasiness that China may be taking advantage of America in a number of economic relationships. And underneath all that, there is probably some anxiety and resentment.

The Chinese are also becoming more triumphalist and somewhat more nationalistic. These tendencies, in brief, could not necessarily determine, but could augur, a more antagonistic relationship between the two to the detriment of both.

How would it be to the detriment of both?


Look, we are now in a situation in which our economies are so interactive that a sudden jolt in one to the advantage of the other would ultimately badly affect both.

For a long time, we all thought that the rise of capitalism would coincide with a rise in democracy around the world. China seems to have embraced a type of capitalism that’s not tethered to democratic reform at all. How do you explain that, and do you think that is a fundamental change in the way the world is or the way we perceive the world?


First of all, I think it’s too early to conclude that there is no impact on China. I think there is some evidence [that democratic movements have had an influence on the country]. The 300-million-strong Chinese middle class is beginning, in some parts, to claim its own civic rights and its own notion of what a civic society ought to involve in the political realm – namely, respect for law, social participation in decision making, decentralization of power, and so forth. So in that respect, there could be some drift toward democracy in China, albeit slow. The second point to make in general is, however, that the political awakening worldwide and its populist manifestations are not always necessarily pointed towards democracy. That’s the other side of the coin: namely, that in fact that mass political activism can also at some points become very nationalistic or ideological, or fanatical even.

That’s obviously happening in the Arab awakening, which is not necessarily linked positively to America. Do you think the Arab awakening can actually be a threat to American interests and ideals for that reason? And the good work you did at Camp David, can that be unravelled by the natural or manifested desires of the people in the Arab world?


I think you are absolutely right. I think the Arab awakening could turn increasingly nasty because it is driven by resentments against exploitation, discrimination, manipulation, [and] corruption. It is not driven necessarily, though, by deep understanding of democratic principles, constitutional rule, and so forth. If that sense of rebellion against the past begins to assume more intolerant forms, as it seems to be in some cases, and if it were to merge at the same time with outbreaks of violence in the Middle East – for example, as a result of an Israeli attack on Iran – we could have a more wide-ranging upheaval in the region, which would probably, among other things, take on very strongly anti-American manifestations.

So what does America need to do to preserve and protect its role in the world?


Well, [laughs] that requires an answer nearly half the length of my book. Namely, a great deal of very deliberate domestic reforms addressing the weaknesses that are becoming increasingly self-evident in the political system, in the social system, [and] in the economic system, together with a foreign policy that tries to build wider frameworks of co-operation between those parts of humanity that are likely to be effectively politically organized, and the co-operation of which is necessary for dealing with the increasingly menacing global problems that we all confront. And that means, in brief, as I try to argue in my book, a policy that expands the West by deliberately but patiently embracing both Turkey and Russia in the West. And by an intelligent American policy in the Far East, which does not get involved in mainland problems, treats China – to the extent that’s possible – as a partner, but also seeks to mediate and conciliate between China and Japan, and to mitigate the rising tensions between India and China.

As you say in the book, these need to be top-down policies. Are you confident that course will be pursued by whoever is going to be in the White House in 2013?


The answer is no. You allow me a margin of wishful thinking, but I’m not confident, no.

Interesting.


[Laughs] Are you?

Everyone knows what the American dream is. Is there a Chinese dream? If so, how would you define it?


That’s a good question, but I won’t answer it because I really wouldn’t know how to define it yet. But it’s something that combines the future with China’s prolonged and very proud past. We ought to be aware of the fact that their past is as important to their future as the future is purely for us.


Original Article
Source: the mark news
Author: Zbigniew Brzezinski