The Harper government has gone to the wall, and beyond, in defence of its beleaguered F-35 jet fighter program. It’s time for a backward shuffle, with alacrity. There will never be a better time than now, with both carrot and stick mitigating for a reboot.
Last spring, you will recall, Auditor-General Michael Ferguson meted out an epic spanking to the Conservatives on this file, when he confirmed that the top-line cost they cited in the 2011 election – $9-billion for 65 planes, or $15-billion including maintenance and other life-cycle costs – was $10-billion shy of true.
Even the internal Defence department figure of $25.1-billion, the one withheld from the public, was suspect, because it assumed a 20-year life cycle. The longevity of these Lockheed-Martin-built aircraft, according to the Pentagon, is 36 years. So an honest price tag, all-in, will necessarily be substantially higher than any number cited so far, by anyone in the Canadian government.
The Conservatives have repeatedly promised not to spend more than the original budget – $9-billion, plus maintenance. That’s not nearly enough to pay for the 65 planes called for, at minimum, in Canada’s air defence plan, let alone the dozen or more replacements that will be required because of attrition.
This is further complicated by the fact that the final cost depends on the number of planes ordered internationally in any given year, and orders are under pressure all over the world due to budget cuts. Even the Pentagon is now not certain to order its original 2,443 copies. There are rumblings about dramatic reductions, possibly even cancellation, as the U.S. grapples with its fiscal cliff.
This is the conundrum that will come to light when, as my colleague John Ivison has reported, accountancy firm KPMG’s pending cost review is tabled in the House of Commons. The review is expected to be released before Christmas.
Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose, who took on the F-35 mess after Ferguson’s audit, has been signaling since the spring that she was unhappy with military procurement generally. Recently, Ambrose went further. On Nov. 22 in the House, speaking about the F-35, she said the government is committed to “a full evaluation of all choices, not simply a refresh.” She added: “When it comes to the statement of requirements, the review of options will not be constrained by the previous statement of requirements.”
This last is key: The SOR made stealth a requirement. The F-35 having been deemed the only modern jet fighter with this capability, it was the only possible choice. Now, judging from Ambrose’s remarks, stealth is no longer a must-have. This means that Boeing’s Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, Saab’s Gripen, and the Eurofighter Typhoon are, in theory, contenders. Others may emerge.
Incoming Chief of the Defence Staff General Thomas Lawson, in an appearance before the House of Commons Defence committee Nov. 29, further opened this door when he confirmed what industry critics have long said; the F-35 is not the only modern fighter with measures to evade radar, though it may be the most advanced in this respect. “Is there only one airplane that can meet the standard of stealth that’s set out in the statement of requirements?” Liberal defence critic John McKay asked. Lawson’s answer: “No.”
Meantime, former Industry Minister David Emerson last week published a report on the aerospace and space sectors, calling on Ottawa to more aggressively press for Industrial and Regional Benefits (IRBs) and In-Service Support (ISS) contracts when inking procurement deals. “In the past,” the report states, “Canadian companies benefited from providing in-service support (ISS) for planes bought for the use of the Royal Canadian Air Force, using engineering and technical data provided by the aircraft manufacturers.”
Emerson’s report continues: “In both these areas – industrial benefits requirements and ISS – it is possible to adjust policies and programs in ways that will produce better outcomes for both the Canadian industry and for the government as the purchaser and user of the aircraft.”
Subtext: Lockheed-Martin is famously reluctant to turn over proprietary technology to its clients – which limits the local industrial benefits. The cabinet is known to have been unhappy with the IRBs that accrued to Canada from the purchase of Lockheed-Martin’s C-130J short-haul transport. So, perhaps a change of heart, driven by economics as much as politics, is in the wind. Emerson is respected in Ottawa by all parties. His word carries heft.
The Harper government has clung to the F-35 project, at great political cost, because it has not wanted to scuttle a deal made with its major international partners, led by the United States, and be seen as a fair-weather friend.
That rationale is no longer sustainable, if it ever was. A full reset, based on a fair, transparent international competition, managed by bureaucrats at arms-length from political oversight, is long overdue. There is no political downside for the Conservatives, only upside, in doing this. They may as well get on with it.
Original Article
Source: national post
Author: Michael Den Tandt
Last spring, you will recall, Auditor-General Michael Ferguson meted out an epic spanking to the Conservatives on this file, when he confirmed that the top-line cost they cited in the 2011 election – $9-billion for 65 planes, or $15-billion including maintenance and other life-cycle costs – was $10-billion shy of true.
Even the internal Defence department figure of $25.1-billion, the one withheld from the public, was suspect, because it assumed a 20-year life cycle. The longevity of these Lockheed-Martin-built aircraft, according to the Pentagon, is 36 years. So an honest price tag, all-in, will necessarily be substantially higher than any number cited so far, by anyone in the Canadian government.
The Conservatives have repeatedly promised not to spend more than the original budget – $9-billion, plus maintenance. That’s not nearly enough to pay for the 65 planes called for, at minimum, in Canada’s air defence plan, let alone the dozen or more replacements that will be required because of attrition.
This is further complicated by the fact that the final cost depends on the number of planes ordered internationally in any given year, and orders are under pressure all over the world due to budget cuts. Even the Pentagon is now not certain to order its original 2,443 copies. There are rumblings about dramatic reductions, possibly even cancellation, as the U.S. grapples with its fiscal cliff.
This is the conundrum that will come to light when, as my colleague John Ivison has reported, accountancy firm KPMG’s pending cost review is tabled in the House of Commons. The review is expected to be released before Christmas.
Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose, who took on the F-35 mess after Ferguson’s audit, has been signaling since the spring that she was unhappy with military procurement generally. Recently, Ambrose went further. On Nov. 22 in the House, speaking about the F-35, she said the government is committed to “a full evaluation of all choices, not simply a refresh.” She added: “When it comes to the statement of requirements, the review of options will not be constrained by the previous statement of requirements.”
This last is key: The SOR made stealth a requirement. The F-35 having been deemed the only modern jet fighter with this capability, it was the only possible choice. Now, judging from Ambrose’s remarks, stealth is no longer a must-have. This means that Boeing’s Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, Saab’s Gripen, and the Eurofighter Typhoon are, in theory, contenders. Others may emerge.
Incoming Chief of the Defence Staff General Thomas Lawson, in an appearance before the House of Commons Defence committee Nov. 29, further opened this door when he confirmed what industry critics have long said; the F-35 is not the only modern fighter with measures to evade radar, though it may be the most advanced in this respect. “Is there only one airplane that can meet the standard of stealth that’s set out in the statement of requirements?” Liberal defence critic John McKay asked. Lawson’s answer: “No.”
Meantime, former Industry Minister David Emerson last week published a report on the aerospace and space sectors, calling on Ottawa to more aggressively press for Industrial and Regional Benefits (IRBs) and In-Service Support (ISS) contracts when inking procurement deals. “In the past,” the report states, “Canadian companies benefited from providing in-service support (ISS) for planes bought for the use of the Royal Canadian Air Force, using engineering and technical data provided by the aircraft manufacturers.”
Emerson’s report continues: “In both these areas – industrial benefits requirements and ISS – it is possible to adjust policies and programs in ways that will produce better outcomes for both the Canadian industry and for the government as the purchaser and user of the aircraft.”
Subtext: Lockheed-Martin is famously reluctant to turn over proprietary technology to its clients – which limits the local industrial benefits. The cabinet is known to have been unhappy with the IRBs that accrued to Canada from the purchase of Lockheed-Martin’s C-130J short-haul transport. So, perhaps a change of heart, driven by economics as much as politics, is in the wind. Emerson is respected in Ottawa by all parties. His word carries heft.
The Harper government has clung to the F-35 project, at great political cost, because it has not wanted to scuttle a deal made with its major international partners, led by the United States, and be seen as a fair-weather friend.
That rationale is no longer sustainable, if it ever was. A full reset, based on a fair, transparent international competition, managed by bureaucrats at arms-length from political oversight, is long overdue. There is no political downside for the Conservatives, only upside, in doing this. They may as well get on with it.
Original Article
Source: national post
Author: Michael Den Tandt
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