Critics have much to say about the current diplomacy. Why narrowly debate Assad’s chemical weapons when there are more pressing U.S. goals in Syria: removing Assad from of power, bolstering moderate and democratic factions in the opposition, isolating the Al Qaeda-linked elements, and stopping a humanitarian crisis? Why spend diplomatic energy removing one particularly awful weapon from Assad’s arsenal when the civil war will just continue? (In fact, if reports in the region are to be believed, Russia will simply bolster Assad’s conventional capabilities in return for Assad agreeing to give up his unconventional weapons.) On the other hand, the use of chemical weapons, as Steve Coll has written, is a particularly indiscriminate, awful, and illegal way to wage a war.
Obama’s current dilemma is one of his own making. Russia’s plan seems to be a delaying tactic that Assad will exploit, and it’s an idea that they have apparently been pushing for some time. The plan only became legitimized when Kerry announced that Assad could avert an attack by relinquishing his weapons. If Obama had not been hurtling toward an embarrassing defeat in Congress over his request for a resolution to allow the use of force, perhaps he would have swatted away Putin’s proposal, as Kerry’s aides initially did. Instead, Obama used the last-minute diplomatic opportunity to save himself from a stinging rebuke from lawmakers, similar to what David Cameron suffered in the U.K.
Indeed, if there was any chance of winning that vote, Obama would have pressed forward with even more determination after Russia announced its plan, because the congressional resolution would have strengthened Obama in his negotiations. That’s the sequence George W. Bush used in 2002: first he won a congressional resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq; then he secured a U.N. resolution giving Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.”
Ironically, as the negotiations continue in Geneva and New York, Obama now finds himself in the same situation as Bush, only without the backing of Congress. The current debate over the Syrian resolution at the U.N. is strikingly similar to the one over the Iraqi resolution—Resolution 1441—eleven years ago. All five permanent members of the Security Council agree that Syria should be disarmed of its chemical weapons, just as they all agreed, in 2002, that Iraq should be disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction. Back then, the U.S. and U.K. insisted on language that allowed for military action if Iraq failed to comply with U.N. weapons inspectors. France, Russia, and, China refused. They insisted that the resolution could not have a “trigger” or “automaticity.” That same argument is now being repeated over Syria, only this time the French have joined the U.S. and U.K. and have even drafted a resolution allowing for “all necessary measures” to be taken against Syria if Assad fails to comply.
So what are the possible outcomes of diplomacy? The Iraq analogy is worth considering. In that case, a policy of disarmament eventually morphed into a policy of régime change. Many Syria hawks, like John McCain, are far less concerned with the narrow issue of disarming Assad of chemical weapons, and are more interested in defeating him militarily. The White House has said that Assad must go, but it has also strained to point out that Obama is only considering military intervention to deter Assad’s use of chemical weapons, not to change the trajectory of the war.
One danger of a successful United Nations resolution is that it puts the U.S. on the same path as in Iraq: a cat and mouse game with inspectors, repeated confrontations over compliance, and mission creep that draws the U.S. inexorably into a war. Indeed, a United Nations resolution similar to the French proposal, which sets up a strict schedule for Assad to give up his weapons and includes penalties for noncompliance, would immediately increase America’s military commitments in Syria. Currently, Obama’s red line for intervention has been the use of chemical weapons. The resolution being considered at the U.N. would change that standard to the possession of chemical weapons. Obama would face the same pressures that both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush faced along the road to war against Saddam: a dictator defying the U.N, hawks in Congress pressing for régime change, a sympathetic opposition begging for more help. Perhaps this is why McCain, along with several other senators, was working on a new congressional resolution this week backing a United Nations resolution that includes the use of force against Syria for noncompliance.
Of course, given that China and Russia seem intent on blocking anything meaningful at the U.N., perhaps the diplomatic route is doomed, anyway, and perhaps Obama will soon be back to Congress asking again for authorization for a limited strike. And perhaps Putin’s shenanigans and a failure at the U.N. will buy Obama some extra support in Congress. It could even be a preferable course. A unilateral strike of the type Obama was originally considering has both less reward and less risk than what he’s trying to accomplish at the U.N. It would not disarm Assad of his chemical weapons, but it also has less of a chance of drawing the U.S. deeper into the war. A tough U.N. resolution, on the other hand, could be Obama’s way out—or it could be our country’s way in.
Original Article
Source: newyorker.com
Author: Ryan Lizza
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