Something funny happened this week on the way to marking the 30th anniversary of the repatriation of the Constitution and the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While the assessment of English-speaking analysts of the impact of the Charter over the last thirty years was largely positive, their French-speaking counterparts struck a markedly different tone. Focusing their remarks on the Charter’s impact on federalism, opinion leaders still express concern over the power of the Charter to erode our system’s ability to reflect its federal nature.
There is no question that, in many ways, the adoption of the Charter has had a positive impact on Canada. But from the point of view of its impact on political discourse about federalism and the practice of federalism, it is difficult to argue with the French-Canadian scholarship on the issue.
Whether we consider the major attempts at constitutional reform such as Meech or Charlottetown, or the more “mechanical” attempts at improving the intergovernmental system such as SUFA (the Social Union Framework Agreement), the Council of the Federation or the Health Accord, most political observers assess these proposals in terms of how it will “play in Quebec.” That is the lens through which federalism initiatives are judged, all too often to the exclusion of other regional considerations.
This is not to suggest that there is no good reason for this. As was made plain by some of the media coverage last week, the wound caused by the adoption of the Constitution without Quebec’s signature has not yet healed and therefore remains a legitimate concern for governments. Indeed, the scars left by the night of the long knives have had a profound impact on how we manage the Canada-Quebec relationship.
Even within Quebec, the actions and decisions of federal ministers, or federalist provincial ministers, are immediately assessed in terms of what it means to Quebec’s autonomy. While this may explain at least in part the asymmetry we have progressively built into our federal system over the last three decades – certainly not necessarily a bad thing – one has to wonder whether Quebec “opts out” of federal arrangements because it is the right policy decision, or whether it is sometimes the only possible political decision. To what extent has that affected the quality of decisions over time? Conversely, have the other provinces been afforded the same opportunity? Does Quebec have more autonomy because it is the only province to need more, or might some of those devolved powers be beneficial to other provinces as well?
We should be asking ourselves these and other important questions, but we won’t – at least for now. Because above all else, the most lasting political lesson of these constitutional battles is “don’t touch a thing.” The failures of Meech and Charlottetown, and their consequences for the popularity of Mulroney and his party (to say nothing of national unity), have led every political leader since to vow never to touch the constitution – “non-constitutional means” of reform are now a virtue in our politics.
In essence, we have put our constitution in a glass box at a museum – to be admired and respected, but certainly not touched. This is in sharp contrast to the German “Basic Law,” which has been amended some 50+ times since 1949. The very name “Basic Law” implies a set of rules and principles that underlie everything else – a living, breathing document that evolves along with the people for whom it was written. A far cry indeed from our “frozen in time” museum view, where every attempt at getting close to the constitution sounds the alarm and gets you kicked out of the building.
Federalism is at its best when it is allowed to evolve, adapt and grow. It has to be flexible. That flexibility has to include an ability to review the basic rules of the game, as defined by our constitution. To deprive our leaders of the option to consider constitutional reform as part of how they modernize federal arrangements is to severely limit their ability to ensure federalism remains relevant.
Writing in Le Devoir last week, former Quebec minister of Intergovernmental Affairs Benoît Pelletier spoke of the reform of 1982 as unfinished business. He could not be more right. As we look to Canada’s sesquicentennial, we should ask ourselves how long we can go without Quebec’s signature on our Basic Law. As other provinces increasingly look to emulate Quebec in acquiring new powers or increased autonomy in areas dear to their priorities, we should have a good hard look at the state of our system and the ability of our leaders to resolve future pressures on our federal arrangements.
It is easy to think of the absence of conflict as a positive development. But we must take care not to see peace where in fact there is drift. Sometimes anger and frustration are more easily dealt with than indifference. As recent polls confirm, the constitutional malaise persists, but that should not mean a permanent ban on debating the issue. In most cases, ignoring the diagnosis does not improve the health of the patient. Ironically, there may be less risk for the political leader who dares to raise the issue than there will be – eventually – for those who insist on ignoring it.
Original Article
Source: ipolitics
Author: Graham Fox
There is no question that, in many ways, the adoption of the Charter has had a positive impact on Canada. But from the point of view of its impact on political discourse about federalism and the practice of federalism, it is difficult to argue with the French-Canadian scholarship on the issue.
Whether we consider the major attempts at constitutional reform such as Meech or Charlottetown, or the more “mechanical” attempts at improving the intergovernmental system such as SUFA (the Social Union Framework Agreement), the Council of the Federation or the Health Accord, most political observers assess these proposals in terms of how it will “play in Quebec.” That is the lens through which federalism initiatives are judged, all too often to the exclusion of other regional considerations.
This is not to suggest that there is no good reason for this. As was made plain by some of the media coverage last week, the wound caused by the adoption of the Constitution without Quebec’s signature has not yet healed and therefore remains a legitimate concern for governments. Indeed, the scars left by the night of the long knives have had a profound impact on how we manage the Canada-Quebec relationship.
Even within Quebec, the actions and decisions of federal ministers, or federalist provincial ministers, are immediately assessed in terms of what it means to Quebec’s autonomy. While this may explain at least in part the asymmetry we have progressively built into our federal system over the last three decades – certainly not necessarily a bad thing – one has to wonder whether Quebec “opts out” of federal arrangements because it is the right policy decision, or whether it is sometimes the only possible political decision. To what extent has that affected the quality of decisions over time? Conversely, have the other provinces been afforded the same opportunity? Does Quebec have more autonomy because it is the only province to need more, or might some of those devolved powers be beneficial to other provinces as well?
We should be asking ourselves these and other important questions, but we won’t – at least for now. Because above all else, the most lasting political lesson of these constitutional battles is “don’t touch a thing.” The failures of Meech and Charlottetown, and their consequences for the popularity of Mulroney and his party (to say nothing of national unity), have led every political leader since to vow never to touch the constitution – “non-constitutional means” of reform are now a virtue in our politics.
In essence, we have put our constitution in a glass box at a museum – to be admired and respected, but certainly not touched. This is in sharp contrast to the German “Basic Law,” which has been amended some 50+ times since 1949. The very name “Basic Law” implies a set of rules and principles that underlie everything else – a living, breathing document that evolves along with the people for whom it was written. A far cry indeed from our “frozen in time” museum view, where every attempt at getting close to the constitution sounds the alarm and gets you kicked out of the building.
Federalism is at its best when it is allowed to evolve, adapt and grow. It has to be flexible. That flexibility has to include an ability to review the basic rules of the game, as defined by our constitution. To deprive our leaders of the option to consider constitutional reform as part of how they modernize federal arrangements is to severely limit their ability to ensure federalism remains relevant.
Writing in Le Devoir last week, former Quebec minister of Intergovernmental Affairs Benoît Pelletier spoke of the reform of 1982 as unfinished business. He could not be more right. As we look to Canada’s sesquicentennial, we should ask ourselves how long we can go without Quebec’s signature on our Basic Law. As other provinces increasingly look to emulate Quebec in acquiring new powers or increased autonomy in areas dear to their priorities, we should have a good hard look at the state of our system and the ability of our leaders to resolve future pressures on our federal arrangements.
It is easy to think of the absence of conflict as a positive development. But we must take care not to see peace where in fact there is drift. Sometimes anger and frustration are more easily dealt with than indifference. As recent polls confirm, the constitutional malaise persists, but that should not mean a permanent ban on debating the issue. In most cases, ignoring the diagnosis does not improve the health of the patient. Ironically, there may be less risk for the political leader who dares to raise the issue than there will be – eventually – for those who insist on ignoring it.
Original Article
Source: ipolitics
Author: Graham Fox
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