The coupling of Serbia's future EU membership with the prosecution of outstanding war criminals is illogical and bound to lead to disappointment.
Many argue that by arresting former Bosnian Serb leaders and war criminals Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, and Goran Hadzic, Serbia has made the “quantum leap” it needed in order to move toward acceptance into the European Union. This notion has been reinforced, over the past few years, by frequent statements from both Belgrade and the EU. A closer examination of the issue, however, reveals serious problems with the logic in connecting the arrests and EU ascension in a causal relationship.
Why should the legal prosecution of accused war criminals be considered a precondition for political membership in the EU? Is it not common practice among civilized societies to apprehend criminals and ensure that they are brought to justice? Furthermore, how does such an action ensure that a country is ready for EU membership?
By stressing the importance of apprehending these criminals in relation to Serbia’s goal of achieving EU membership, Belgrade and the EU are sending out the wrong message with regard to the standards all countries are expected to abide by. Belgrade should have made it clear long ago that the arrest of these accused war criminals was Serbia’s obligation irrespective of its goal to join the EU, particularly since it claims to be trying to establish democratic credibility.
The Mark discusses why Ratko Mladic's arrest could help reconciliation in the Balkans, but poses tough questions for future international prosecutions here.
Thus far, the record among Serbia’s ruling political elites is not impressive. Slobodan Milosevic not only knowingly harboured these war criminals, but also closely co-operated with them in the bloody destruction of the Yugoslav Federation. The policy of Vojislav Kostunica, the first democratically elected Serbian leader after Milosevic, didn’t prove much better. The late Zoran Djindzic took a more pragmatic approach, and, if given the chance, he might have hastened their arrests. Unfortunately, before he could take action, he was gunned down by rogue assassins who were, in one way or another, connected to some of the accused war criminals.
Current Serbian President Boris Tadic opted to play a curious political game with the EU. He slowly introduced the link between Serbia’s potential for EU membership and the arrests of these accused war criminals, promising unconditional co-operation with the EU if he was allowed to leverage the arrests for the benefit of Serbia’s EU aspirations. It appears he had already probed the European reaction to this awkward causal connection and determined that there was something to be gained.
For policymakers in the EU, the link seemed plausible, and promised valuable returns. For them, one of the most appealing aspects of this proposal was that it meant the EU would be able to project regional authority without making any financial obligations. It also allowed the EU to play the “carrot and stick” game in the region yet again, offering the “carrot” of EU membership in exchange for the arrests of the three war criminals. This is a game that the EU has become quite good at over the past 15 years. Furthermore, the EU was delighted to deal with a co-operative Serbian leader who might bring closure to serious regional burdens. The arrests of the three accused war criminals would bring recognition to the EU’s commitment to follow through with the stabilization of the Balkans.
It is important to note that the arrests were made fairly quickly once Belgrade decided to devote more attention to the issue. Serbian authorities did not take drastic steps toward detaining these individuals. They simply announced that whenever they came into contact with the accused, the arrests would be made. In order to expedite the process, they merely made life difficult for the accused war criminals by cutting their pensions, refusing them state-provided apartments, and denying them health care – all very simple measures to administer. And the results came fast. Karadzic was arrested in the middle of Belgrade, Mladic in a small village in central Serbia, and Hadzic in the middle of a desperate attempt to sell a stolen painting that he had picked up in the Yugoslav wars.
Learn how Hadzic's bungled stolen art deal led to his arrest here.
Now that these war criminals have been arrested, what’s next? It comes as no surprise that Serbia is still not considered ready to join the European Union. Although the country is probably one of the most likely Balkan states to achieve EU ascension, it is still far behind EU standards in terms of social, economic, and political development. The arrests did little to address these matters. The EU, having learned the hard lesson with Bulgaria and Romania that political promises are insufficient reason for membership, will have to rescind its promises once again and adjust its policies to reflect parameters that really matter.
In the current situation, Serbia and the EU will likely end up seriously disappointed and disillusioned with each other. Serbian political elites will have a bitter taste in their mouths if the EU fails to keep its promise of speedy integration, and will be less co-operative on other important regional issues, such as those in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. The EU, on the other hand, might soon learn that the “carrot and stick” game is no longer a plausible strategy for influencing events in countries that aspire to join the club – at least so long as it is unwilling or unable to make good on the “carrots.”
The Serbia-EU situation makes a number of things clear. First, the EU should avoid promising membership to countries that do not yet qualify, as actions that those countries take in an effort to “win” that promised membership may yet be insufficient. Making such promises is thus a risky enterprise that can backfire, and the fallout can be difficult to deal with. Second, rewards should not be offered for actions that are considered normal for a functioning democratic state: Rewarding expected behaviour is never smart policy. Finally, Serbia should learn to take responsibility for its past actions. It must take certain steps, no matter how unpleasant, to rectify decisions for which it is often criticized. And it must do so without expecting to be rewarded. The country has much potential and will eventually play an important role in the region, but, in order to make this to happen, its political leaders need to start earning the trust of others on their own initiative.
Origin
Source: the Mark
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