In Canada, the debate over possible reforms to our democratic institutions is frequently derailed by the claim that x or y would be inconsistent with the British parliamentary traditions on which our governance is based.
For the most part, such claims seem made with little understanding of the dynamic history of those still-evolving traditions, or the basic precepts upon which they are founded.
Through centuries of evolution, the central notion of British parliamentary governance has involved empowering a group of citizens with the authority to limit the powers of the Crown, to control the purse strings and to shape the laws of the land.
A brief recap of the rich history of English democratic reform may be useful:
1066: William the Conqueror introduced the feudal system to England, subjecting the Crown’s proposed laws to consideration by a council of nobles and bishops.
1100: Henry I proclaimed the English Charter of Liberties, formally outlining limits on the Crown’s powers.
1215: King John agreed to the original Magna Carta, subjecting the Crown’s powers to the rule of law — and specifically agreeing no taxes would be levied except by consent of the Great Council. The council evolved into early “parlements.” The 13th century reigns of Henry III and Edward I saw the Magna Carta modified numerous times, forming the foundations of English constitutional law.
1258: The Oxford Parliament, led by Speaker Simon de Montfort, produced the Provisions of Oxford, which established a privy council jointly chosen by the King and the barons. Parliaments would meet three times each year to review activities.
1295: Edward I summoned the Model Parliament, made up of 49 lords and 292 “commoners” elected to represent counties and boroughs across England. The commoners began to demand the Crown redress grievances in return for approving proposed taxes.
1326: Parliament forced Edward II to abdicate.
1341: Lords and commoners met separately for the first time, creating today’s bicameral Houses of Parliament.
1376: With Parliament, and particularly the Commons, gaining influence throughout the tax-hungry reign of Edward III, the Good Parliament challenged corruption in the Royal Council. This prompted the earliest known Parliamentary impeachment of a minister of the Crown.
1628: Following disputes between Parliament and Charles I over war costs and taxes, Parliament demanded Charles I accept the Petition of Right, restricting taxation not approved by Parliament and imposing other limits on Crown authority.
1642: The English Civil War pit parliamentarians against Royalists over the supremacy of Parliament or the Crown. Charles I lost his throne (and his head), Charles II was exiled, the principle of parliamentary supremacy was established, the constitutional requirement for the Crown to obtain parliamentary consent was solidified, and future sovereigns were restricted to a constitutional monarchy with limited executive authority.
1649: The Rump Parliament’s House of Commons passed laws abolishing the monarchy and the House of Lords (citing the latter as “useless and dangerous to the people of England”).
1657: Parliament presented the Humble Petition and Advice to Oliver Cromwell, asserting parliamentary control over taxes, establishing an independent council to advise the Crown and recreating the second chamber — thereby establishing the modern structure of contemporary English parliamentary government.
1660: The Restoration-era Convention Parliament restored the monarchy and the House of Lords, and established the tradition that governments depend upon Parliament for legitimacy.
1689: Parliament adopted the Bill of Rights.
1701: Parliament passed the Act of Settlement governing the order of succession of the Crown.
1708: Royal Assent was refused on Parliament’s Scottish Militia Bill, marking the last time in history the Crown refused to assent to a bill adopted by the British House of Commons and House of Lords.
What does this history have to do with 21st century democratic reform in Canada?
It provides some clues — if we are looking for them — concerning the original, central theories that shaped our system of parliamentary governance, which have fallen into disregard. These revolve around Parliament’s overriding authority to decide taxing and spending, to create law and to restrain the power of the Crown.
The central premises are as straightforward as they are fundamental. First, no one person, not even one advised by wise ministers, can decide these things alone. Second, the elected legislature is supreme. Third, as was understood early on, democratic governance requires both a separation of powers and meaningful checks and balances.
These theories of parliamentary supremacy, power separation, and checks and balances have largely gone missing in Canada’s modern democratic institutions. Just as sadly, they are largely absent from the debate about how to revitalize these institutions.
How has Canada strayed from the British parliamentary system?
In the British parliamentary system, the ministry — or cabinet (including the prime minister) — evolved as an interface between Parliament and the Crown.
The ministry’s authority to advise the Crown derived from Parliament.
Both the Crown and the ministry required parliamentary approval to enact laws, raise taxes or spend money.
When parliamentarians become sufficiently dissatisfied with the advice and proposals of the ministry, Parliament has the authority to fire the ministry by voting non-confidence, and to form a successor government through parliamentary realignment.
Throughout the 20th century, Canadian democratic institutions have wandered further and further from these core principles. In modern Canadian politics, some of these relationships have been turned on their head.
Start with the Crown. In almost all circumstances, the Crown remains a power player in name only. For 99.9 per cent of what transpires in Canadian governance, the Crown and ministry have effectively merged into a single entity. On paper, the ministry still advises the Crown. In reality, the advisee has nothing much to do with that advice except to say, “sure, thanks.”
It used to be that Parliament provided a check on the power of the Crown. In today’s evolved context that means Parliament’s important role is to provide a check on the power of the merged Crown/ministry.
Unfortunately, our Parliament no longer accomplishes that in much more than a pro-forma fashion. And, it has not done so for decades.
Today, instead of the ministry being the agents of Parliament in advising the Crown, dismissible by Parliament when judged necessary, it is pretty much the other way around. It is Parliament that may be dismissed when convenient to the ministry.
Instead of the confidence convention being a power tool used by Parliament to control the Crown/ministry, it has become the hammer by which the ministry’s whips command subservience.
Instead of Parliament governing the purse strings — that most basic and hard-won parliamentary authority — the ministry controls taxing and spending, and demands ratification by Parliament. Yes, of course, Parliament must approve them, but the Crown’s budget bills may not be defeated by Parliament —nor even amended — without triggering the probable dissolution of Parliament. Wars were fought and blood was shed in order that the people’s elected Parliament gain this central power. It has been whittled away, quietly surrendered with barely a murmur.
Inexplicably, legions of political scientists stand ready to proclaim this parliamentary emasculation as our tradition.
How did we get here? And, more importantly, how do we get back on track?
We got here in part because, as with so many other areas, we are victims of poor knowledge of our own history. We think of bloody revolutions and legislative supremacy and separation of powers as more American or French than British or Canadian. We are wrong. The French learned from English ideas, the English learned from French ideas. And, they both beheaded kings over these matters.
Go back and read your 17th century history of England’s Charles I, of divinely ordained royal prerogative, of usurious taxes prompting popular rebellion, of a decade of bloody civil war between Parliamentarians and Royalists, culminating in a royal beheading, abolition of the monarchy and declaration of republic. These events played out a century before the French and American revolutions.
The fact that we do not know our history leads us to misunderstand our traditions and to fail to recognize when they are being usurped.
Several modern-day factors propel us down the road we are on: the leader-centric tendencies of the modern media era; any power structure’s inherent instinct for self-aggrandizement; inexplicably compliant parliamentarians; successive waves of legislative “reforms” that have provided party leaders with excessive powers over party finances, over parliamentary business and even over the appointment or disallowance of candidates for Parliament.
Add to these the absence of coherent made-in-Canada articulations of essential governance theories of checks, balances and the separation of powers. Too often, these are simply dismissed as U.S.-style notions.
And, finally, why are Canadians such suckers for efficiency in governance? Yes, democracy is messy, it takes time, it can be unpredictable. But as Churchill observed, it beats the alternatives. We need it, and we need to do it properly.
How can this be turned around?
The good news is that it doesn’t require another Glorious Revolution — indeed no revolution of any kind.
The most basic, most important, thing is to start transferring powers absorbed by leaders back to Parliament and parliamentarians.
Start with who gets to fire whom. The prime minister should not decide when to dissolve Parliament; this must be Parliament’s decision. Better yet, Parliament should fix elections at four-year intervals, save for rare declarations of non-confidence.
The prime minister’s ability to declare a vote on X or Y to be a “confidence measure” (for example, you’re all fired if you vote against me) must end. Parliament can declare non-confidence as it sees fit; meanwhile votes and amendments on bills, including budget bills, should proceed on the merits of their content.
In recent decades, parties have awarded their leaders the power to appoint, or reject, candidates for Parliament. This is a democratic abomination. Parliament is supposed to be a check on the ministry; the ministry cannot be appointing parliamentarians. No one should get to Parliament by appointment; this is basic. The prime duties of parliamentarians must be to the country as a whole and to their own electors in particular, not to their party or leader.
For the same reasons, the Senate must be democratized. Or abolished. Pick one. The status quo of an appointed legislative body is not a democratic option.
Parliamentarians must regain the independent authority to determine Parliament’s business, and to determine the membership and leadership of parliamentary committees.
Change the language; change the culture. When MPs dare speak out on some matter contrary to the dictates of their leaders and whips, why do we term them “dissidents” as opposed to, say, “representatives” or “democrats?” Why are they shunned by parliamentary colleagues and treated as flakes in media reporting, rather than celebrated for providing evidence of Canada’s rich mosaic of perspectives? Why are they not congratulated for the courage of their convictions? The truth is there is a healthier diversity of opinion across Canada, and within each party, than one could ever glean from the outside. That may be an inconvenient truth for leaders who would prefer a set-up in which everyone pretends to have the same view as the leader — but for the rest of us it is a happy truth.
Such conformity of thought would be sad were it true; why on earth do we pretend it to be so?
Along the same lines: partisanship. Reduce it. No party is always right, none always wrong. Stop pretending otherwise. Throw away talking points. Journalists should stop crowding around MPs in parliamentary scrums. Seek out the folks with something useful to say, something thoughtful, original, constructive and less partisan.
Make elections matter. Not coincidentally, many of the foregoing changes would revitalize the role of local MPs, drawing upon their talents in a more profound way than as robotic agents for their leaders.
Make the nomination and election of candidates for Parliament important in its own right, not just for tallying up which of their leaders gets to exercise more or less unchecked power for the next few years. Electoral reform to make every vote count, and to improve representativeness, would be a positive reform as well.
The foregoing is not intended as an exhaustive list. There are other good ideas around. Nor is it meant as a partisan critique of Liberals or Conservatives or New Democrats. Each, in opposition, promises democratic reforms. Each, in power, instead concentrates power in the hands of the ministry, and particularly in the hands of the prime minister. That was not the idea; in fact, it was basically the opposite of the idea.
This is more than a problem of the left or the right. It is ingrained in our power psychology. It is cultural. It is institutional.
We pretty much know how to improve things. It’s time to do that.
In the pages of this magazine, readers will find an assortment of thoughtful, provocative ideas and proposals for strengthening our democracy and improving the way we do politics. Many of them expand on these notions. While I may not agree with every proposal, there is one thing of which I am certain: they are all worthy of consideration, and we will already be strengthening our democracy if we begin the discussion.
Original Article
Source: iPolitico
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