The sorry tale of the F-35 stealth fighter jets just got worse, and not because Auditor General Michael Ferguson is issuing a report on the Department of National Defence's procurement process next week. For it has emerged that F-35s suffer from - believe it or not - flaky skin.
The ability of F-35s to avoid radar detection depends on a "fibre mat," which is cured into the composite surfaces of the aircraft.
In December 2011, a test version of the F-35 for the first time achieved the design speed of Mach 1.6.
According to Bill Sweetman of Aviation Week, the flight caused "peeling and bubbling" of the stealth coating on the horizontal tails and damage to the engine's thermal panels, and the entire test fleet was subsequently limited to Mach 1.0.
Repairing and replacing stealth materials is a timeand technology-intensive process that reduces the "mission capable rate" of aircraft. Indeed, it has been reported by the U.S. Congressional Research Service that after five years of service the F-35's sister plane, the F-22, has a mission capable rate of just 60%.
If the F-35 has a similar mission capable rate, Canada will, at any given time, only be able to deploy approximately 44 of its planned 65 planes. When attrition through accidents is factored in - and Canada has lost 18 of its CF-18s since 1982 - we could soon have an available fleet of just 30-35 planes, or roughly half of what the Department of National Defence says we need.
We'll also be paying for billions of dollars in additional costs, which might explain why the Canadian government has not released any projections about the maintenance contract it will have to sign with Lockheed Martin, nor indicated whether that contract will be negotiated together with, or after, the contract to purchase the planes.
Anyone who thinks that we're exaggerating these risks should consider the socalled "legacy costs" imposed by our blind-eyed procurement of submarines from the British Navy.
In 1998, Canada bought four second-hand Upholder class submarines for $750-million. Since then, over $3-billion has been spent on repairs, overhauls and upgrades.
Some of that money went toward refitting the submarines to fire MK-48 American torpedoes. The first test torpedo was fired only last month, 14 years after the submarines were purchased.
Equipment-related accidents have also stricken the fleet: A deadly fire within hours of the first sailing; a dented hull that prevented submerging; and a crash into the ocean floor off British Columbia that, had it compromised the pressure hull, could have resulted in the loss of the vessel and all 48 of its crew.
The international arms trade is based firmly on the motto "buyer beware." Legacy costs arise when procurement decisions are made without fully investigating all of the financial implications of new equipment, including maintenance. The risk of such costs only increases when decisions are made to acquire unproven technologies such as stealth.
We know the F-35 program is in crisis. Our ally Australia has acted responsibly, buying 24 new F/A-18 Super Hornets as a stopgap measure while it carefully re-assesses the situation.
Isn't it time for Canada to craft its own "Plan B"?
Michael Byers holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia. Stewart Webb is a research associate with the Salt Spring Forum. They are the authors of "Canada's F-35 Purchase is a Costly Mistake," published last month in the peer-reviewed Canadian Foreign Policy Journal.
Original Article
Source: national post
Author: Michael Byers And Stewart Webb
The ability of F-35s to avoid radar detection depends on a "fibre mat," which is cured into the composite surfaces of the aircraft.
In December 2011, a test version of the F-35 for the first time achieved the design speed of Mach 1.6.
According to Bill Sweetman of Aviation Week, the flight caused "peeling and bubbling" of the stealth coating on the horizontal tails and damage to the engine's thermal panels, and the entire test fleet was subsequently limited to Mach 1.0.
Repairing and replacing stealth materials is a timeand technology-intensive process that reduces the "mission capable rate" of aircraft. Indeed, it has been reported by the U.S. Congressional Research Service that after five years of service the F-35's sister plane, the F-22, has a mission capable rate of just 60%.
If the F-35 has a similar mission capable rate, Canada will, at any given time, only be able to deploy approximately 44 of its planned 65 planes. When attrition through accidents is factored in - and Canada has lost 18 of its CF-18s since 1982 - we could soon have an available fleet of just 30-35 planes, or roughly half of what the Department of National Defence says we need.
We'll also be paying for billions of dollars in additional costs, which might explain why the Canadian government has not released any projections about the maintenance contract it will have to sign with Lockheed Martin, nor indicated whether that contract will be negotiated together with, or after, the contract to purchase the planes.
Anyone who thinks that we're exaggerating these risks should consider the socalled "legacy costs" imposed by our blind-eyed procurement of submarines from the British Navy.
In 1998, Canada bought four second-hand Upholder class submarines for $750-million. Since then, over $3-billion has been spent on repairs, overhauls and upgrades.
Some of that money went toward refitting the submarines to fire MK-48 American torpedoes. The first test torpedo was fired only last month, 14 years after the submarines were purchased.
Equipment-related accidents have also stricken the fleet: A deadly fire within hours of the first sailing; a dented hull that prevented submerging; and a crash into the ocean floor off British Columbia that, had it compromised the pressure hull, could have resulted in the loss of the vessel and all 48 of its crew.
The international arms trade is based firmly on the motto "buyer beware." Legacy costs arise when procurement decisions are made without fully investigating all of the financial implications of new equipment, including maintenance. The risk of such costs only increases when decisions are made to acquire unproven technologies such as stealth.
We know the F-35 program is in crisis. Our ally Australia has acted responsibly, buying 24 new F/A-18 Super Hornets as a stopgap measure while it carefully re-assesses the situation.
Isn't it time for Canada to craft its own "Plan B"?
Michael Byers holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia. Stewart Webb is a research associate with the Salt Spring Forum. They are the authors of "Canada's F-35 Purchase is a Costly Mistake," published last month in the peer-reviewed Canadian Foreign Policy Journal.
Original Article
Source: national post
Author: Michael Byers And Stewart Webb
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