The Conservative government proposes to strengthen civilian oversight of CSIS by eliminating the Office of the Inspector General. This “good news“ was buried in the recent Budget Implementation Act. The savings are of some $1 million per year of “taxpayers” money from the Public Safety Portfolio’s $7 billion budget.
A spokesperson for the Public Safety Minister advised that oversight will be strengthened as the review function will be consolidated into the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) and employees of the Department will also be provided greater responsibility for providing independent advice to the Minister. Having spent some twenty years in the national security area I was somewhat surprised by this announcement. In terms of credibility the assessment of the consequences flowing from this proposal ranks with the utterance by the Black Knight of Monty Python fame who, having had both his arms cut off by King Arthur, says that it is “but a flesh wound”.
Canadians should consider some basic facts as they assess the merits of this proposal. After all, CSIS is a domestic intelligence agency whose primary focus is the activity of people in Canada. The communications that it covertly intercepts and the searches that it covertly undertakes occur here, in your towns and cities, not in some far off land.
CSIS was created from the ashes of the RCMP Secret Service. Its investigative mandate was restricted in light of the numerous misadventures of the RCMP during the FLQ crises. Facts uncovered during the lengthy McDonald Commission and submissions and debates entertained during a joint Senate and House of Commons Committee shaped the regime that we have had for the past 28 years. Recognizing the realities of intelligence work and the imperative of sheltering its operational activities from casual scrutiny, checks were put in place to identify and curtail potential inappropriate activities.
In contrast to his relationship with the RCMP, the Minister through Directives exercises hands-on control of the Service. Recently the Minister issued a Directive relating to the use of information that may have been derived from torture and ministers, in the past, ordered the Service to disband its labour desk. The Minister by law has to personally approve all applications made by the Service to intercept communications and to conduct covert searches.
This level of Ministerial engagement is necessary to ensure civilian control of the intelligence agency in light of the breadth of its mandate, the fact that ‘grounds to suspect’ trigger its investigations and that activities do not have to be unlawful to be investigated. The Minister is responsible for a portfolio, which employs some forty thousand individuals, of which CSIS is one portion. How can he possibly fulfill his responsibilities to the public and ensure that CSIS hasn’t stepped over the line?
The reality is he cannot. In recognition of this fact Parliament in 1984 provided for the Office of the Inspector General. The I.G. and its staff are specifically tasked in sections 30 to 33 of the CSIS Act to examine the operation activities of the Service to ensure that it has not contravened its policies, Ministerial Directives, any law of Canada and further that it has not exercised its powers in either an unnecessary or unreasonable manner.
Most importantly, CSIS is by law required to provide to the I.G. any information, report and explanation that the I.G. requires to fulfill its mandate. The Inspector General through an annual certificate provides its assessment of CSIS activities to the Minister, which assessment is shared with the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC). It is for this reason the Inspector General has been called the “Eyes and Ears” of the Minister. Employees of the Department of Public Safety have no such powers of access. Having been the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister at Public Safety responsible for national security activities, I see no way in which the Department can fulfill any of the responsibilities of the Inspector General.
The threat environment in which CSIS operates after 9/11 is quite challenging with the emergence of home grown terrorism and the resurgence of espionage activities by foreign states. This reality presumably accounts for the growth by some 50 per cent of personnel at CSIS from 2,091 in 2000-2001 to 3,104 in 2009-2010. One might be forgiven for thinking that the significant increase of CSIS personnel, with a corresponding increase in budget, would have entailed the need for more staff for the Inspector General as opposed to the elimination of the office.
It may be that the Minister believes that the Service is a more mature organization and can be trusted not to engage in activities that will bring itself or the government into disrepute. Does the history of the Service since 1984 justify such a belief?
When he made the decision to eliminate the office was the Minister aware of the Atwal case in which the Service acknowledged that it filed erroneous information with the court in support of a wiretap application? The fallout from that event entailed the resignation of the then Director of the Service although many in Parliament called for the Minister’s resignation.
Did he ponder upon the Heritage Front Affair and the angst that activity occasioned for the Reform Party? If these activities are too far in the past to recall, did he consider the Arar, Air India or Iacobucci Inquiries and the tens-of-millions of dollars spent and the subsequent erosion of public trust in the Service? Did he recall the $10.5 million of “taxpayers’ money” paid to Mr. Arar by the Conservative Government in compensation for the torture that he suffered?
Did anyone bring to his attention the outstanding claims by Messers. Almalki, Elmatti and Nureddin for some $180 million or the claim for $27 million by Abdul Razak? All of these legal actions remain outstanding but are founded upon allegations of improper actions by the intelligence service.
The sums of money already paid on Inquiries and compensation to Arar and the outstanding claims represent a couple of hundred years of financing for the Office of the Inspector General.
One must consider the obligation placed upon the Minister to ensure that the Service in the performance of its important activity acts in a manner consistent not only with the bare requirements of the law but also in a manner that is both reasonable and necessary.
The Minister is proposing to cut off his “Eyes and Ears”, which by extension are ours, to save one million dollars from his seven billion dollar budget. Even Monty Python’s Dark Knight got to keep his eyes and ears.
Original Article
Source: ipolitics
Author: Paul Kennedy
A spokesperson for the Public Safety Minister advised that oversight will be strengthened as the review function will be consolidated into the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) and employees of the Department will also be provided greater responsibility for providing independent advice to the Minister. Having spent some twenty years in the national security area I was somewhat surprised by this announcement. In terms of credibility the assessment of the consequences flowing from this proposal ranks with the utterance by the Black Knight of Monty Python fame who, having had both his arms cut off by King Arthur, says that it is “but a flesh wound”.
Canadians should consider some basic facts as they assess the merits of this proposal. After all, CSIS is a domestic intelligence agency whose primary focus is the activity of people in Canada. The communications that it covertly intercepts and the searches that it covertly undertakes occur here, in your towns and cities, not in some far off land.
CSIS was created from the ashes of the RCMP Secret Service. Its investigative mandate was restricted in light of the numerous misadventures of the RCMP during the FLQ crises. Facts uncovered during the lengthy McDonald Commission and submissions and debates entertained during a joint Senate and House of Commons Committee shaped the regime that we have had for the past 28 years. Recognizing the realities of intelligence work and the imperative of sheltering its operational activities from casual scrutiny, checks were put in place to identify and curtail potential inappropriate activities.
In contrast to his relationship with the RCMP, the Minister through Directives exercises hands-on control of the Service. Recently the Minister issued a Directive relating to the use of information that may have been derived from torture and ministers, in the past, ordered the Service to disband its labour desk. The Minister by law has to personally approve all applications made by the Service to intercept communications and to conduct covert searches.
This level of Ministerial engagement is necessary to ensure civilian control of the intelligence agency in light of the breadth of its mandate, the fact that ‘grounds to suspect’ trigger its investigations and that activities do not have to be unlawful to be investigated. The Minister is responsible for a portfolio, which employs some forty thousand individuals, of which CSIS is one portion. How can he possibly fulfill his responsibilities to the public and ensure that CSIS hasn’t stepped over the line?
The reality is he cannot. In recognition of this fact Parliament in 1984 provided for the Office of the Inspector General. The I.G. and its staff are specifically tasked in sections 30 to 33 of the CSIS Act to examine the operation activities of the Service to ensure that it has not contravened its policies, Ministerial Directives, any law of Canada and further that it has not exercised its powers in either an unnecessary or unreasonable manner.
Most importantly, CSIS is by law required to provide to the I.G. any information, report and explanation that the I.G. requires to fulfill its mandate. The Inspector General through an annual certificate provides its assessment of CSIS activities to the Minister, which assessment is shared with the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC). It is for this reason the Inspector General has been called the “Eyes and Ears” of the Minister. Employees of the Department of Public Safety have no such powers of access. Having been the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister at Public Safety responsible for national security activities, I see no way in which the Department can fulfill any of the responsibilities of the Inspector General.
The threat environment in which CSIS operates after 9/11 is quite challenging with the emergence of home grown terrorism and the resurgence of espionage activities by foreign states. This reality presumably accounts for the growth by some 50 per cent of personnel at CSIS from 2,091 in 2000-2001 to 3,104 in 2009-2010. One might be forgiven for thinking that the significant increase of CSIS personnel, with a corresponding increase in budget, would have entailed the need for more staff for the Inspector General as opposed to the elimination of the office.
It may be that the Minister believes that the Service is a more mature organization and can be trusted not to engage in activities that will bring itself or the government into disrepute. Does the history of the Service since 1984 justify such a belief?
When he made the decision to eliminate the office was the Minister aware of the Atwal case in which the Service acknowledged that it filed erroneous information with the court in support of a wiretap application? The fallout from that event entailed the resignation of the then Director of the Service although many in Parliament called for the Minister’s resignation.
Did he ponder upon the Heritage Front Affair and the angst that activity occasioned for the Reform Party? If these activities are too far in the past to recall, did he consider the Arar, Air India or Iacobucci Inquiries and the tens-of-millions of dollars spent and the subsequent erosion of public trust in the Service? Did he recall the $10.5 million of “taxpayers’ money” paid to Mr. Arar by the Conservative Government in compensation for the torture that he suffered?
Did anyone bring to his attention the outstanding claims by Messers. Almalki, Elmatti and Nureddin for some $180 million or the claim for $27 million by Abdul Razak? All of these legal actions remain outstanding but are founded upon allegations of improper actions by the intelligence service.
The sums of money already paid on Inquiries and compensation to Arar and the outstanding claims represent a couple of hundred years of financing for the Office of the Inspector General.
One must consider the obligation placed upon the Minister to ensure that the Service in the performance of its important activity acts in a manner consistent not only with the bare requirements of the law but also in a manner that is both reasonable and necessary.
The Minister is proposing to cut off his “Eyes and Ears”, which by extension are ours, to save one million dollars from his seven billion dollar budget. Even Monty Python’s Dark Knight got to keep his eyes and ears.
Original Article
Source: ipolitics
Author: Paul Kennedy
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