In the second half of 2011, the Afghan government and its international allies were busy with talks at the Bonn 2 Conference (the 11th international conference in 10 years) and the OECD’s High Level Forum in Busan, South Korea, about how donors can effectively deliver aid. Unfortunately, the communiqués that came out of these international meetings were pages of discussions that offered no specific guidance for “walking the talk.” The resulting declarations are nothing but a rewording of oft-repeated, decade-old promises and agreements that have yet to be met.
Despite its promises, the Afghan government has failed to implement measures to prevent corruption, and the international community’s development programs are not free of corruption either, nor are they necessarily cost effective. In fact, critics inside Afghanistan are convinced there needs to be a 10-year assessment of the cost effectiveness of the billions spent in promoting security, the rule of law and governance, and social and economic development.
In the last few months, I have spoken with a few eminent Afghans who once served in high positions in the post-Taliban government, but were thrown out of their positions for opposing chaotic governance. These individuals are now searching for ways to stem Afghanistan’s sharp deterioration on all fronts.
According to former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah, a central problem is that the Afghan government and its international allies have failed to root democracy firmly in the soil of Afghanistan. While elections – an indicator of progress toward democracy – have been held, they have been marred by fraud and corruption.
Afghans welcomed their first direct election in 2004. At that time, they were proud to have elected their own government, and believed the constitution would protect their basic rights. However, the government and international community never established democratic institutions to protect the democratic rights of the people, and those rights were subsequently crushed. Power struggles and disputes over the parliamentary elections of 2010, in particular, further bruised the government’s legitimacy. It is therefore not surprising that Afghans regard democracy as an imposition of the West – and one that has failed to improve Afghan society.
Clearly, electoral reform needs to be a priority for Afghanistan, as do reforms of the legal system, which can ensure justice and equal rights for the people. The eminent Afghans I met with all agree that democratic institutions in Afghanistan are nonoperational. The police are unable to protect the civil rights of the people, and accessing justice is impossible.
There is also a general consensus that security across the country has deteriorated, as seen in the brutal and synchronized Taliban attack that recently rocked Kabul and capitals of other provinces. The hope and anticipation that the post-9/11 expulsion of the Taliban and the first Bonn Conference ushered in are lost. The Afghan government and the international community failed to establish a safe and secure Afghan society.
In fact, in the 10 years that the international community has been operating in Afghanistan, the law and order situation has deteriorated. High-level Afghans consider inadequate leadership throughout the country to be a serious deficiency that is contributing to insecurity and weak governance by limiting the country’s institutional capacity.
Adding to this insecurity and governance chaos is the fact that international financial institutions predict an economic slowdown in Afghanistan. The high level of aid that Afghanistan currently receives (estimated at $15.7 billion in 2010, which almost equals the country’s GDP), cannot be sustained.
Declining aid may not impact the country’s economic growth as much as anticipated, as most international assistance to Afghanistan is not spent in Afghanistan – it leaves the economy through imports, expatriate profits, and outward remittances. Nevertheless, with the drawdown of the military forces and the inevitable increase in insecurity and likely reduction in development assistance, real GDP growth may decrease to five or six per cent by 2018.
Reviving growth and sustaining the development process will require concerted reform efforts on the part of the Afghan government and the international community. Such reforms will be integral to Afghanistan’s transition beyond 2014.
Original Article
Source: the mark news
Author: Nipa Banarjee
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