For British Columbians of a certain age, watching events in Montreal over the past four months may have been bringing back memories of political turmoil on the west coast nearly three decades ago.
In May, 1983 — after campaigning on a platform of public sector restraint during one of the worst recessions in the province’s history — Premier Bill Bennett won his third majority mandate.
Two months later, following intense cabinet discussions but virtually no public consultations, the Bennett government tabled a restraint budget targeting public sector wages and staffing levels. Then, minutes later, it introduced 26 pieces of legislation, including one eliminating rent controls and another that did away with the existing human rights commission.
Aside from the stunned NDP opposition in the legislature, many British Columbians felt the government was going well beyond the mandate it had received in the election; within a week 35-40,000 protesters packed the old Empire Stadium in Vancouver. A few days later, about 25,000 people gathered on the lawns of the provincial legislature in Victoria.
By August, the trade union movement had formed “Operation Solidarity” to oppose measures affecting public sector employees. It also linked arms with social and community groups, which demanded that the entire package of legislation be withdrawn.
In October, 60,000 people marched in the streets of Vancouver, the largest such demonstration in the city’s history. With layoffs scheduled to begin with the expiry of the public service contract, talk of a general strike was in the air, as it has been in Québec. Yet, for all the similarities, the situation on the west coast at that point unfolded quite differently.
Premier Bennett inserted his deputy minister into the public service negotiations and a new contract was signed. During breaks in these negotiations, a side deal was discussed with the head of BC’s largest private sector union that led to a late night agreement at Mr. Bennett’s Kelowna home. That agreement shut down all talk of a general strike by the province’s powerful trade union movement.
To explain the difference between BC in 1983 and Québec today, one must begin by noting the weak political position in which Jean Charest finds himself. Mr. Charest just lost a by-election in a safe riding, and signs that he was finally considering calling an election to resolve the situation have quieted down. Premier Bennett, on the other hand, had just secured a majority mandate — and a strengthened one at that.
Unlike Jean Charest, Mr. Bennett became involved personally at an early stage of the protests, meeting with the leaders of the “Solidarity Coalition” as one example. In light of the extraordinary situation, he was not concerned about establishing a precedent by negotiating with the protesters; the agreement that ensued made some changes to the legislative package while leaving most of it intact. And he did not leave these critical negotiations to a minister but centralized them in his office.
In the beginning, British Columbia’s “Solidarity Coalition” had considerable support in the media (which did not, as today, include either all-news networks or Twitter!). Eventually, however, editorialists joined the business community and private sector trade unions in trying to prevent further damage to the provincial economy.
As in Québec, Mr. Bennett’s opponents made several mistakes, including demonstrating outside the home of a cabinet minister and occupying the Premier’s Office in Vancouver. Most important, however, the “Solidarity Coalition” was riven with divisions — between public and private sector unions, and between the unions and community groups.
Some, perhaps many, private sector workers were prepared to engage in a general strike to help their public sector brothers and sisters. Few, however, were ready to leave their jobs to press the demands of community groups — especially when they began to suspect that the agenda of some in the “Solidarity Coalition” was to overturn the results of the May election and replace the government.
From the beginning, trade union leaders — having as in Québec financed the extra-parliamentary opposition — were in control of the protests, which appears not to be the case in Québec. Moreover, unlike Québec student leaders, these trade union leaders were experts in negotiating and deal-making. And they knew how to sell an agreement to their members — even if, as it turned out, it meant selling out the other half of their coalition.
Original Article
Source: ipolitics
Author: Norman Spector
In May, 1983 — after campaigning on a platform of public sector restraint during one of the worst recessions in the province’s history — Premier Bill Bennett won his third majority mandate.
Two months later, following intense cabinet discussions but virtually no public consultations, the Bennett government tabled a restraint budget targeting public sector wages and staffing levels. Then, minutes later, it introduced 26 pieces of legislation, including one eliminating rent controls and another that did away with the existing human rights commission.
Aside from the stunned NDP opposition in the legislature, many British Columbians felt the government was going well beyond the mandate it had received in the election; within a week 35-40,000 protesters packed the old Empire Stadium in Vancouver. A few days later, about 25,000 people gathered on the lawns of the provincial legislature in Victoria.
By August, the trade union movement had formed “Operation Solidarity” to oppose measures affecting public sector employees. It also linked arms with social and community groups, which demanded that the entire package of legislation be withdrawn.
In October, 60,000 people marched in the streets of Vancouver, the largest such demonstration in the city’s history. With layoffs scheduled to begin with the expiry of the public service contract, talk of a general strike was in the air, as it has been in Québec. Yet, for all the similarities, the situation on the west coast at that point unfolded quite differently.
Premier Bennett inserted his deputy minister into the public service negotiations and a new contract was signed. During breaks in these negotiations, a side deal was discussed with the head of BC’s largest private sector union that led to a late night agreement at Mr. Bennett’s Kelowna home. That agreement shut down all talk of a general strike by the province’s powerful trade union movement.
To explain the difference between BC in 1983 and Québec today, one must begin by noting the weak political position in which Jean Charest finds himself. Mr. Charest just lost a by-election in a safe riding, and signs that he was finally considering calling an election to resolve the situation have quieted down. Premier Bennett, on the other hand, had just secured a majority mandate — and a strengthened one at that.
Unlike Jean Charest, Mr. Bennett became involved personally at an early stage of the protests, meeting with the leaders of the “Solidarity Coalition” as one example. In light of the extraordinary situation, he was not concerned about establishing a precedent by negotiating with the protesters; the agreement that ensued made some changes to the legislative package while leaving most of it intact. And he did not leave these critical negotiations to a minister but centralized them in his office.
In the beginning, British Columbia’s “Solidarity Coalition” had considerable support in the media (which did not, as today, include either all-news networks or Twitter!). Eventually, however, editorialists joined the business community and private sector trade unions in trying to prevent further damage to the provincial economy.
As in Québec, Mr. Bennett’s opponents made several mistakes, including demonstrating outside the home of a cabinet minister and occupying the Premier’s Office in Vancouver. Most important, however, the “Solidarity Coalition” was riven with divisions — between public and private sector unions, and between the unions and community groups.
Some, perhaps many, private sector workers were prepared to engage in a general strike to help their public sector brothers and sisters. Few, however, were ready to leave their jobs to press the demands of community groups — especially when they began to suspect that the agenda of some in the “Solidarity Coalition” was to overturn the results of the May election and replace the government.
From the beginning, trade union leaders — having as in Québec financed the extra-parliamentary opposition — were in control of the protests, which appears not to be the case in Québec. Moreover, unlike Québec student leaders, these trade union leaders were experts in negotiating and deal-making. And they knew how to sell an agreement to their members — even if, as it turned out, it meant selling out the other half of their coalition.
Original Article
Source: ipolitics
Author: Norman Spector
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