But the allegations, though unproven, have also renewed questions about what to do with Canada’s small but growing population of violent, extremist inmates, to make sure they change their views before they get out.
Ali Dirie, for example, is one of Canada’s largely unrepentant terrorist convicts, who has gone under the radar since he was released from the country’s only super-maximum security prison in 2011.
Kept away from the general prison population so they cannot spread their radical views or recruit others, convicted terrorists are lumped together in one isolated wing of the Ste-Anne-des-Plaines prison 45 kilometres northwest of Montreal, which some say does not bode well for their reform.
Surrounded by barbed wire, with guards in several high towers monitoring their every move, the inmates at the Ste-Anne-des-Plaines penitentiary are strictly regulated and rigidly controlled.
The Special Handling Unit or SHU (pronounced shoe), the super-maximum security wing of the prison, has been home to notorious killers like Allan Legere, Clifford Olson and Maurice (Mom) Boucher.
But of late, the SHU has also housed most of Canada’s dozen or so extremists convicted of terrorist activities.
Unlike Olson, however, who died there in 2011, some of these men have, or will be, released. The question is will they be any less dangerous?
Dirie, known as the gunrunner of the Toronto 18, was initially arrested in 2005 after trying to smuggle into Canada two loaded handguns taped to his thighs. But from prison, he then tried to recruit inmates for extremist plots and procure weapons and travel documents. He was convicted for his role in the Toronto 18 plots to build and detonate truck bombs in Toronto and Ottawa, and storm Parliament and CSIS headquarters, among other targets.
After a parole board hearing in 2010, the board concluded that there was a “moderate probability that you will once again engage, in the medium and long term, in violent behaviour at both the general crime and terrorism levels.”
He was released after serving his full term in October 2011.
Corrections Canada would not provide a list of current inmates at the SHU, citing privacy concerns. But three other members of the Toronto 18 are believed to be there, including ringleaders Fahim Ahmad and Zakaria Amara. Also believed to be incarcerated at the SHU are Momin Khawaja, a 29-year-old Ottawa resident who was convicted of participating in a “terrorist group” and helping to build an explosive device, and Said Namouh, who was living in Maskinongé when he was arrested and convicted in 2009 of distributing “jihadist” propaganda online. Namouh was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Lynn Brunette, a spokesperson for Correctional Service Canada, said inmates at the SHU have no direct contact with anyone (with the possible exception of each other), unless they are handcuffed and accompanied by correctional officers.
Personal visits, interviews with staff or “program delivery” all occur through a shatterproof, clear Plexiglas barrier that prevents any possibility of direct contact with staff.
In an email to The Gazette, Brunette said that SHU inmates follow programs on violence prevention, substance abuse and personal motivation as part of their Correctional Plan, and may benefit from “correctional interventions, psychiatric and psychological interventions, personal development opportunities, recreational opportunities, Elder services, spiritual counselling, and Chaplaincy services.”
But she couldn’t say if any programs were available to the men in isolation, convicted of terrorism-related offences, to address their specific characteristics.
Unlike sex offenders and other more common criminal profiles for which programs have been developed, it is not clear whether any program exists in Canada to reform criminals whose violence stems from ideological beliefs.
“CSC addresses the challenges linked to radicalization within the correctional environment through Case Management, and its Population Management Strategy,” Brunette wrote. “CSC has shared, and will continue to share, information and best practices on this important topic with both its domestic (RCMP, CSIS, CBSA and Public Safety, etc.) and other partners (United Nations, Interpol, etc.)”
There is a growing consensus that such programs are crucial to public safety.
A 2009 study by Elaine Pressman, commissioned by Public Safety Canada, concludes as follows: “Correctional systems will need to develop distinct policies and procedures for managing violent extremists. Given their unique risk factors, standard correctional programs are unlikely to meaningfully influence the recidivism risk of violent extremists.”
A secret CSIS document from 2012 released to the National Post through an access-to-information request suggests Canada’s spy agency views prisons as one of several venues of radicalization.
“Many intelligence services have examined the phenomenon of radicalization in the context of correctional institutions. Both the service and the integrated terrorism assessment centre have examined the issue from a Canadian perspective.”
Unfortunately, the rest of that section was redacted. (Tahera Mufti, a spokesperson for CSIS, said it is not within CSIS’ mandate to develop programs for inmates.)
In 2011, the federal government also committed $10 million over five years to its Kanishka Project — named for the plane destroyed in the 1985 Air India bombing that killed 329 people, most of them Canadians — to conduct research into preventing and countering violent extremism, including research on prison radicalization.
Alex Wilner, a native of Montreal and a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, said it is time to develop an effective program to de-radicalize inmates — while there are only a dozen in need.
“Canada is unique in that there are only a few (extremist inmates) compared to hundreds of European inmates. It gives us the opportunity to learn from others.”
Programs exist in France, Spain and England, for example, as well as in Saudi Arabia. Pressman, in her 2009 study, reported on Saudi Arabia’s well-funded, eight to 12 week program, administered to 3,000 inmates. “Only 9 were rearrested for returning to ‘jihad’,” she wrote.
In Canada, there are so few such inmates, Wilner said, we can tailor programs to suit each one.
“What were the triggering factors in (Momin) Khawaja’s case?” Wilner asked. “Does he need more religious tutelage, does he need to have a better grasp of Islamic history? If we can find out, maybe we can attend to his needs in a way that will affect him positively. ... It’s a numbers game. We can do this now or wait till we have more radicals in prison and do a catch-all process. At this point, we would be better to do a tailored approach.”
Wilner said some of the individuals in question may come out of prison totally reformed. Some may assert they are fanatics and radicals, he said, “but they are also young men who did stupid things and can change in prison.”
Research suggests that inmates need to meet others and re-socialize with members of the general prison population.
“Putting them all together may hinder the rehabilitation process. And if that’s the case, what we are doing is short-sighted,” Wilner said. “Most of these individuals will be back on the streets eventually. Dirie is one case, and other members of the Toronto 18 will be back out. If they are not rehabilitated properly, we are doing ourselves a disservice.”
Pressman, for her part, has worked on developing a tool to assess, if not necessarily change, individuals convicted of violent, ideologically motivated crimes. Her study mentions the variety of terrorist groups that have been active in Canada, from the Front de libération du Québec, to the Squamish Five, to the al-Qaida-inspired Toronto 18.
The Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA) would test individual members of such groups on a number of factors from “attitude items” such as a perception of injustice and grievances, to “contextual items” — anger at political decisions, and actions of the country — and “historical items,” like travel for non-state sponsored training/fighting.
But VERA would also look at “protective” or moderating influences: a rejection of violence, change in view of the enemy, as well as their age, sex and marital status. Being married for more than one year reduces the risk of recidivism, for example.
Wilner has made several recommendations for how to de-radicalize this particular sector of the prison population, from excluding radical religious leaders from visiting prisons and censoring texts available in prison libraries — no Mein Kampf, Anarchist Cookbook or the Protocols of the Elders of Zion — to providing educational services, and helping convicts reintegrate into society.
He also suggests surveillance of those inmates who have not renounced radicalism and “who can yield vital information about plots within and outside prison walls.”
Who is watching Ali Dirie, for example?
Mufti, of CSIS, said former convicts are not the agency’s responsibility.
“In the Toronto 18 case, we gathered intelligence over a long time, then contacted the RCMP who did their own parallel investigation,” Mufti said. “Once they are in the prison world, it doesn’t fall under our jurisdiction anymore. Our mandate is very clear.”
Correctional Service Canada also does not follow-up on former inmates if, like Dirie, they have served their full sentences, but provide the police with all the appropriate information concerning offenders prior to their release.
“The local police have the option of applying for a peace bond, which, if granted, will impose restrictions on these ex-offenders,” Brunette said.
It is not known where Ali Dirie settled upon his release. The RCMP would not comment on whether they monitor former inmates of the SHU’s extremist wing. “It is not our practice to discuss investigations in the public domain,” corporal Laurence Trottier said.
Original Article
Source: canada.com
Author: Catherine Solyom
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