The events in Mali are unfolding in a rapid and dramatic fashion.
Just two weeks ago, this landlocked North African country was virtually unmentioned in the Canadian media, and now it has become a central theme of office water-cooler discussion.
To date, the Harper government’s response has been, at times, contradictory, often inexplicable and consistently out of touch with the events happening on the ground.
The roots of the Mali conflict are a byproduct of the colonial era, wherein European powers simply covered up the map of Africa like a checkerboard. The ruler-straight lines that separate former French colony Mali from neighbouring Niger, Burkina Faso and Algeria do not reflect in any way the ethnic composition of the area.
As such, the nomadic Tuareg people, who live in almost uninhabitable desert tracts in the Sahara, take little heed of these artificial boundaries.
Since its independence from France in 1960, there have been four Tuareg separatist rebellions fought in Mali.
The most recent clash began in January 2012 when Tuareg fighters, who had fought in Libya to support Col. Moammar Gadhafi, returned to Mali flush with heavy weaponry and battlefield experience.
The Tuaregs were assisted in their quest by Islamic fundamentalist organizations, not the least of which is known as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.
The Malian security forces suffered several defeats at the hands of the combined Tuareg and Islamist fighters. Demoralized at their failure, Capt. Amadou Sanogo, in March 2012, staged a military coup and ousted Amadou Toure, the democratically elected president
As the Tuaregs and the Islamic Maghreb continued to seize more territory, the international community condemned the Malian military for usurping democracy.
Under threat of crippling sanctions, Sanogo handed over power to an interim, unelected civilian administration under President Dioncounda Traore.
Under the conditions of this agreement, Traore was to govern for one year and hold an election by May 2013.
Despite having ruled for less than a month, Sanogo retained the status of a former head of state and continues to represent the power behind the presidential throne.
Troops under Sanogo’s orders ousted the country’s appointed prime minister, Cheick mobido Diarra, last December.
For his part, Traore learned early in his tenure that the Malian security forces’ loyalty is not to him. A pro-Sanogo mob of demonstrators injured Traore after his security detail allowed them entry into his office.
In December 2012, the UN Security Council recognized the serious threat posed by the Islamic Maghreb operating in the Tuareg-controlled portion of northern Mali.
As such, the UN authorized an Africa-led military intervention to assist the Malian security forces. This force was to be composed of 3,300 troops from the Economic Community of Western African States. However, before this hodgepodge force could be assembled, the crisis worsened.
With the Tuareg and Islamic Maghreb rebel forces advancing into southern Mali, France responded with a rapid military deployment. By Jan. 14, French combat planes and helicopters were blasting the rebels and the vanguard of a 2,500-strong strong battle group was already on the ground.
Despite Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s assurance to Canadians, just the week before, that we would not directly participate in a military intervention, on Jan. 15, a Royal Canadian Air Force C-17 cargo plane and 35 personnel departed from CFB Trenton in support of the French deployment to Mali.
While this limited commitment of “one plane for one week” will undoubtedly be extended and expanded, it already represents a contradiction of Harper’s previous promise to abstain from any Mali mission.
What is inexplicable is the fact that Canada was chomping at the bit to lend our military muscle to ouster of Gadhafi in Libya, despite the fact that many of the anti-Gadhafi rebels were Islamic extremists.
Now, we are demonstrating absolute reluctance to get involved in a conflict that can be traced directly back to post-Gadhaffi Libya and NATO’s failure to prevent a massive arsenal from falling into the hands of al-Qaida.
At least the French are trying to put the fire out.
To further illustrate how out of touch he is with the reality on the ground in Mali, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird dispatched the Canadian diplomats in Bamako to deliver an official demarche to the Malian government.
With French troops battling to prevent the rebels from seizing the capital, Baird chose that moment to reprimand the Malian government for not focusing on democratic reform.
It’s sort of like telling a man whose pants are on fire that he really should consider a new hairstyle.
Original Article
Source: the chronicle herald
Author: SCOTT TAYLOR
Just two weeks ago, this landlocked North African country was virtually unmentioned in the Canadian media, and now it has become a central theme of office water-cooler discussion.
To date, the Harper government’s response has been, at times, contradictory, often inexplicable and consistently out of touch with the events happening on the ground.
The roots of the Mali conflict are a byproduct of the colonial era, wherein European powers simply covered up the map of Africa like a checkerboard. The ruler-straight lines that separate former French colony Mali from neighbouring Niger, Burkina Faso and Algeria do not reflect in any way the ethnic composition of the area.
As such, the nomadic Tuareg people, who live in almost uninhabitable desert tracts in the Sahara, take little heed of these artificial boundaries.
Since its independence from France in 1960, there have been four Tuareg separatist rebellions fought in Mali.
The most recent clash began in January 2012 when Tuareg fighters, who had fought in Libya to support Col. Moammar Gadhafi, returned to Mali flush with heavy weaponry and battlefield experience.
The Tuaregs were assisted in their quest by Islamic fundamentalist organizations, not the least of which is known as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.
The Malian security forces suffered several defeats at the hands of the combined Tuareg and Islamist fighters. Demoralized at their failure, Capt. Amadou Sanogo, in March 2012, staged a military coup and ousted Amadou Toure, the democratically elected president
As the Tuaregs and the Islamic Maghreb continued to seize more territory, the international community condemned the Malian military for usurping democracy.
Under threat of crippling sanctions, Sanogo handed over power to an interim, unelected civilian administration under President Dioncounda Traore.
Under the conditions of this agreement, Traore was to govern for one year and hold an election by May 2013.
Despite having ruled for less than a month, Sanogo retained the status of a former head of state and continues to represent the power behind the presidential throne.
Troops under Sanogo’s orders ousted the country’s appointed prime minister, Cheick mobido Diarra, last December.
For his part, Traore learned early in his tenure that the Malian security forces’ loyalty is not to him. A pro-Sanogo mob of demonstrators injured Traore after his security detail allowed them entry into his office.
In December 2012, the UN Security Council recognized the serious threat posed by the Islamic Maghreb operating in the Tuareg-controlled portion of northern Mali.
As such, the UN authorized an Africa-led military intervention to assist the Malian security forces. This force was to be composed of 3,300 troops from the Economic Community of Western African States. However, before this hodgepodge force could be assembled, the crisis worsened.
With the Tuareg and Islamic Maghreb rebel forces advancing into southern Mali, France responded with a rapid military deployment. By Jan. 14, French combat planes and helicopters were blasting the rebels and the vanguard of a 2,500-strong strong battle group was already on the ground.
Despite Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s assurance to Canadians, just the week before, that we would not directly participate in a military intervention, on Jan. 15, a Royal Canadian Air Force C-17 cargo plane and 35 personnel departed from CFB Trenton in support of the French deployment to Mali.
While this limited commitment of “one plane for one week” will undoubtedly be extended and expanded, it already represents a contradiction of Harper’s previous promise to abstain from any Mali mission.
What is inexplicable is the fact that Canada was chomping at the bit to lend our military muscle to ouster of Gadhafi in Libya, despite the fact that many of the anti-Gadhafi rebels were Islamic extremists.
Now, we are demonstrating absolute reluctance to get involved in a conflict that can be traced directly back to post-Gadhaffi Libya and NATO’s failure to prevent a massive arsenal from falling into the hands of al-Qaida.
At least the French are trying to put the fire out.
To further illustrate how out of touch he is with the reality on the ground in Mali, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird dispatched the Canadian diplomats in Bamako to deliver an official demarche to the Malian government.
With French troops battling to prevent the rebels from seizing the capital, Baird chose that moment to reprimand the Malian government for not focusing on democratic reform.
It’s sort of like telling a man whose pants are on fire that he really should consider a new hairstyle.
Original Article
Source: the chronicle herald
Author: SCOTT TAYLOR
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