Nevertheless, the scale of the response sets a very troubling precedent. It not only raises unrealistic expectations for the future, it sends the wrong message to terrorists. We need to ask some hard questions about where this is taking us and how to deal with such events in the future.
Shortly after the capture of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the second bombing suspect, President Barack Obama had this to say: “After the attacks on Monday, I directed the full resources of the federal government to be made available to help state and local authorities in the investigation and to increase security as needed.”
With the FBI coordinating the operation, some 9,000 local, regional, state and federal police officers, SWAT teams, aircraft surveillance, and military units joined the manhunt. The entire public transportation system, most businesses and most public institutions were shut down. A dramatic emergency warning was sent to cell phones and other wireless devices, urging over a million people to remain in their homes. The city of Boston was literally shut down.
The scale of this operation is unprecedented. It goes way beyond the measures most experts would have proposed to catch the suspects and keep the population safe. So why did it happen?
The operation likely was intended to show President Obama as decisive and resolute, and to send a clear message to other terrorists who might be tempted to act on American soil — that the president will take whatever steps are necessary to bring them to justice. If so, will this deter terrorists?
When the president first issued his directive, little was known about the bombers. It was not even certain this was a terrorist attack or, if it was, what kind of terrorists were involved. We now know the perpetrators were not well-trained and probably weren’t part of a sophisticated network such as al-Qaida.
However, we can rest assured that far more sophisticated terrorists were watching intently as events unfolded — and were asking themselves what lessons Boston held for their future operations. I can think of at least four points worth noting.
First, terrorism uses fear to advance a cause and radical Islamists, in particular, are willing to go so far as to blow themselves up to make their point. The idea that the show of force in Boston would intimidate them seems simply misguided. These people are not likely to be deterred from acts of terrorism on American soil by the threat of American justice.
Second, the terrorists must have been stunned to see that, in America, two men with homemade bombs in their backpacks were able to draw a virtual army of security forces into the streets, shut down a major city, and have the international media riveted on the event for days. From the terrorist’s viewpoint, this could be the beginning of a whole new way to amplify and deliver their message. Michael Cohen makes a similar point in The Observer.
Third, far from seeing this massive display of force as an expression of strength and resolve, seasoned terrorists are more likely to see it as an expression of fear and inadequacy — a sign of the U.S. government’s inability to respond effectively to terrorist attacks on the ground, and a desperate effort to regain control by overreacting.
Finally, terrorists will realize that the scale of the operation is likely to raise public expectations about the levels of force appropriate to ensure public safety and respond to a terrorist attack.
Taken together, these points raise uncomfortable questions about the appropriateness of the response to the Boston bombings and how it may affect public security and terrorism in the future. Are terrorists now likely to imitate the Boston bombers in an effort to provoke a similar response? If another attack were launched, say, in Philadelphia or Los Angeles, how would authorities respond? Would the public expect — even demand — another massive operation? Is such a standard of public security sustainable? Is it necessary? What of other countries? What kind of protection should citizens expect in Toronto, London or Paris?
Reflecting on these questions returns us to our opening question: Why did officials feel such an operation was right in the first place? The decision almost certainly wasn’t based on best practices, expert advice or lessons learned. Rather, it has all the markings of a political decision aimed at showing the president and other leaders as decisive and resolute.
It’s important to be clear on the difference. Let’s compare this principle of “decisiveness” with the principle that there is no negotiating with terrorists, advanced by President Ronald Reagan. Perhaps the Boston response seems to reflect a similar spirit, but there is a huge difference between them.
The point of Reagan’s principle is that immediate concerns must be weighed against longer-term trends. Negotiating with terrorists today might produce an immediate gain, but it also encourages more terrorism in the long run.
By contrast, the “decisiveness” principle focuses attention narrowly on the immediate crisis, with little thought about the longer term. This seems to be what happened in Boston.
For their part, the media greatly reinforced this. Rather than provide reflective feedback, they focused on the reactions and experiences of the people affected, echoing their highly emotional voices in ways that seemed to confirm the wisdom of the decision.
Now, this is NOT to accuse Obama of crass political calculations or to deny that the president should appear decisive and resolute. But more often than not, the advisors closest to political leaders see the world through the lens of political optics. In times of crisis, their influence dominates.
What Boston teaches us is that this kind of thinking tends to be short-term — often when we most need to see the bigger picture.
Original Article
Source: ipolitics.ca
Author: Don Lenihan
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