Barack Obama’s election as President was accompanied by expectations that were outsized even for the historic nature of his Administration. His more than three hundred sixty-five electoral votes were more than double John McCain’s final tally, and he bested McCain by more than ten million popular votes. The huge database of thirteen million Obama supporters and the campaign’s adroit capacity to raise money through hundreds of thousands of small donations made it appear that Obama was poised to create a new kind of populism, a multihued, progressive version. Instead, Tea Party populism, indignant, highly organized, and deeply invested in a kind of entitled patriotism that saw Obama’s ascent as the country being “taken” from them, took hold. Amid the tempest of paranoia and recrimination in that surrounded the town hall discussions of the Affordable Care Act in the summer and fall of 2009, the most noteworthy thing was not the angry crowds gathered to attack a law that, in their view, sought to kill off their grandmothers but the absence of a cohesive grassroots counteroffensive. This has been a theme in the Obama Presidency. In order to become President, Barack Obama had to create a grassroots machine that could, in primary election after primary election, circumnavigate the Democratic establishment. Yet his Administration has been as insular and remote in its functioning as that of any institutional standard-bearer.
We’ve come to expect congressional losses for the President’s party in midterm elections, but even so the 2014 elections look like a bloodletting. In successive midterms, Obama has lost control of the House and the Senate. In his comments on the election yesterday, he pointed out that nearly six out of ten eligible voters stayed home—and electorate that is even smaller than the diminished turnout of the 2010 midterm. Following that loss, Obama pledged to find common ground with the new House majority. Instead, we witnessed a moribund grand bargain on the budget, successive, manufactured crises surrounding the debt ceiling, a bogus lawsuit against the President filed by the Speaker of the House, and repeated moot votes to repeal the Affordable Care Act—all theatrically orchestrated to appease Republican grassroots movements.
Addressing the results of this week’s election, Obama made a similar promise, yet not even he believes that it is likely to be seen through. The G.O.P.’s newfound majority was facilitated by the fact that they haven’t found common ground with the President. Obama’s idealism survived for barely twenty-four hours. In a press conference where the tone alternated between patronizing and belligerent, John Boehner all but threatened Obama, should he issue an executive order regarding immigration. “He’s playing with fire,” the Speaker said. “He’s going to burn himself if he continues down this path.”
For more than a year, the House failed to approve any version of the immigration bill passed by the Senate. Boehner attributed that inaction to his belief that Obama could not be trusted to enforce the bill, but the real motivation was the backlash that would have come from anything that gave the remote appearance of compromise. The Obama Administration’s aggressive deportation policy was rationalized by some lawmakers and analysts as an attempt to create breathing room for a compromise with the G.O.P. on immigration. Yet, as Eric Cantor’s precipitous demise in Virginia and Rick Perry’s demise in the 2012 primaries showed, there were negative consequences for Republicans deviating even slightly from the hard-line anti-immigrationism of their base. The same could be said for any hopes on climate change. John Boehner’s furtive attempts to craft a grand bargain were undermined by his reasonable reluctance to provoke the wrath of the more radical elements of his caucus. There’s little reason to suspect that Republicans gaining control of the Senate will diminish the political value of intransigence. Like the Congressional Republicans who held out against raising the debt ceiling and stonewalled into a government shutdown, the spectre of appearing to coöperate with the White House is potentially far more damaging than the fallout from obstructing governmental operation.
Six years of Republican obstructionism and messaging about Presidential fecklessness is only part of the reason Democratic candidates were wary of, if not outright hostile to, being too closely identified with Obama. The other factor is that the electoral consequences of doing so were hypothetical and debatable because his Presidency itself was detached—precisely the opposite of what you would have expected in 2008, given how Obama for America constructed their database of motivated voters in every Democratic and Democratic-leaning district in the country. The decision to run away from a President who remains popular within his party and with key segments of the electorate is inscrutable, but no more so than the state of affairs that facilitated it. Obama has consistently appeared as a man who brings a gun to a knife fight but then inexplicably opts to use his fists.
With full control of Congress, the price of even the most minimal compromise will likely be the piecemeal dismantling of the Affordable Care Act. Some future historian will have to grapple with the reasonable temptation to have the book end in the fall of 2014. The more difficult question will be determining when and whether it actually ever got off the ground in the first place.
Original Article
Source: newyorker.com/
Author: BY JELANI COBB
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