But could holding more House votes via secret ballot produce a more democratic Chamber? Or, at least one in which the balance of power between caucus leadership and individual MPs isn’t quite so top-heavy?
While constituents would likely — and rightly — raise a ruckus if they were kept in the dark on how their duly elected representatives voted on major (or even minor) legislative initiatives or budget proposals, putting House management matters to a secret ballot could embolden backbenchers to vote as individual MPs, rather than caucus members.
We do, after all, allow MPs to keep their votes to themselves when electing a House speaker, which makes perfect sense when you think about it, as it neatly nixes any possible perception of bias on the part of the eventual winner, whether in support of those who backed his or her successful bid, or revenge against those who didn’t.
However, there’s one other never-used provision for secret ballots in the House.
Before an item of private members’ business —which includes both bills and motions — can move beyond pro forma first reading to the floor of the Chamber, it must be reviewed by a special all-party panel.
That panel decides whether the item should be deemed non-votable, usually on the grounds that it is clearly unconstitutional, or because it deals with matters outside federal jurisdiction or revisits questions that have already been decided by that particular parliament.
If the sponsoring MP disagrees with that assessment — which, in the relatively rare case that the committee downgrades their proposal to non-votable status, they usually do, since it pretty much moots the whole process — they can appeal the ruling to the full committee.
If that fails, they can appeal to the House as a whole, as long as they have support of at least five fellow backbenchers from a majority of the parties in the House. At that point, the speaker convenes a vote, which is conducted by secret ballot over the course of two sitting days.
By holding the vote in secret, MPs are — at least in theory — free to vote as they see fit without fear of repercussion — or even quiet, reproachful frowns — from the party whip, House leader or even caucus colleagues.
All that said, it’s a procedural mechanism that’s never been used, as we’ve not yet had an MP exercise that option.
And yet, its a mechanism that makes sense. So, why not extend secret voting to other elements of House business? It could be used on items ranging from time allocation and closure motions to proposals to split particularly complex bills into more manageable chunks.
It would also impose new limits on the power of even the most robust majority government to call the shots in the Commons.
Under the current dynamics, a government member who might otherwise be tempted to side with the nays on his or her House leader’s proposal to shut down debate would almost certainly face disciplinary measures ranging from from being pulled off the committee roster to kicked out of caucus.
A secret ballot system would put the onus on that same House leader to convince them to back such a measure on its own merits, rather than out of loyalty or fear.
Meanwhile, an opposition MP with concerns over the scope or complexity of a government bill — a three-inch thick omnibus budget bill, for instance, or a major overhaul of the national security apparatus, as was the case with the controversial C-51 — might have a better shot at convincing a sufficient number of colleagues across the aisle to support a motion to break it down into component parts to ensure more focused scrutiny at committee.
That new threshold — and the risk, however remote, of falling short of it — could also make the government distinctly more reluctant to employ it as frequently and enthusiastically as was the case during the Harper Conservative regime (and arguably, as the perpetual opposition New Democrats would argue, past Liberal governments as well).
As a general rule, we (quite rightly) tend to resist any move to shield politicians and their actions from the public eye. But if allowing occasional outbreaks of parliamentary anonymity could free MPs to weigh in on House affairs without the threat — real or perceived — of party pressure, it might be worth never knowing exactly how the yeas and nays broke down.
Original Article
Source: ottawacitizen.com/
Author: Kady O’Malley
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